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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In December 1989 the United States Intervened in Latin America onceI again adding one more instance to the list whIch Included, among others, 
the 1954 overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala, the 1965 intervention in theI' Dominican RepublIc, and the 1973 assistance given the Chilean mil itary in 
its successful overthrow of Allende In Chile. This latest case was the 
I massive U.S. mllitary Invasion of Panama. From Washlngton's point of 
I 
view, "Operation Just Cause," as it was called, was indeed just. The United 
States was responding to the request of a fairly large proportion of the 
I 
Panamanian population that wished removal from power of General Manuel 
Antonio Noriega, the mllitary ruler of Panama. Noriega's Involvement inI the world of drug trafficking and in questionable hemispheric radical 
political movements prevented him from projecting in Panama a positive I Image of the U.S.-installed clvllian leadership. Washington's public 
explanation was that at the request of its southern neighbor the United 
I States was Simply ridding a friendly nation of an individual many 
Panamanians viewed as a tyrant. 
Yet, behind this relatively simple explanation lies a more complex 
I 
one, one which was not openly discussed as U.S. troops set root on 
Panamanian soil. General Noriega was viewed by the Bush Administration 
as a threat to the stabllity of Latin America, a stability whose peculiar 
characteristics the United States had sought to maintain for more than aI century. Although Panama is a small, relatively young Latin American 
country, it represents a major focal point in traditional definitions of theI U.S. national interest. Although "Operation Just Cause" was ostensibly 
carried out In the name of Panamanian Interests, in reality, It was on a 
I set of Quest10nable national secur1ty assumptIons held by the 
I 
Bush AdministratIon that the massive assault on the small country was 
made. In his refusal to comply with U.S. orders to relinquish power, 
I 
Noriega challenged Washington's control over Panama, one that had been 
exercised since 1903. 
I
 
I
 
I 
I This paper will address the 1989 invasion In terms of the historical 
I 
relationship existing between the two nation-states, that of U.S. as 
protector and Panama as protectorate. The writer's intent is to 
I 
demonstrate that this relatjonshlp has resulted in a de facto loss of 
sovereign control by Panama and, as a result, continues to constitute a 
breach of international law. 
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I .CHAPTER 2 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PANAMANIAN PROTECTORATE 
I The protected state is dependent on the protection and control of a 
superior power. This relationship requires that the weaker nation-stateI allow the protector to Involve itself in the domestic and foreign affairs of 
the country; the protectorate becomes the executor of decisions andI demands or interests of the superior protecting power. It yields decision­
making power to the protector by treaty or other agreement by which it 
I "[releases] its right of non-intervention" (Thomas and Thomas, 92). 
According to one view of international law; 
I 
There is no International duty of self-preservation I falling upon the state to maintain itself as sovereign or lndependenLlt would seem strange 1f a state could not 
consent to a less drastic curtailment of its sovereigntyI	 by releasing Its right of non-intervention, which 
is a right of each Individual state flowing from 
sovereignty itself, although it may be admittedI that by such a treaty the state Is at least placed 
under the political tutelage of another, if notI placed in the status of a protectorate. (Thomas and Thomas, 92) 1 
I Hence, a country may relinquish its right to be an independent actor with 
recognizable pol1tical, economic, and social pol1cies of Its own.I In the case of Panama, dependence on the United States was the result 
of the desires of three actors at the beginning of the present century:I indigenous rebels, the Roosevelt Administration, and Philippe Bunau­
Varilla. The rebels (led, in 1903, by four men: Jose Augustfn Arango,
I Federico Boyd, Dr. Manuel Guerrero Amador, Tomas Arias, and C. C. 
I 
Arosemena) had long sought freedom from Colombian rule but lacked the 
military capability to execute a successful "revolution" (LaFeber 1989, 
19).2 The Roosevelt Administration had secured an agreement with the 
Colombian government for the construction of an inter-oceanic canalI	 across the Panamanian isthmus. The Hay-Herdn Treaty of 1903 gave 
I 3 
I 
I 
I Colombia a $10 mill ion down-payment and $250,000 annuity in exchange
 
for "a 99-year lease on asix-mi Ie-wide canal zone" but, unlike its North
 
I American counterpart, the Colombian Senate refused to ratify the Treaty
 
I
 
(LaFeber, 1989, 18). Frenchman Philippe Bunau-Varilla was also
 
experiencing difficulty in achieving his goal. His efforts to sell the New
 
Panama Canal Company's canal construction rights--before their expiration
 
in 1904--to the Russian czar and the British government were fruitless
I (LaFeber, 1989, 17; McCullough, 279). Therefore, three separate sets of
 
frustrated goals led to plans for the liberation of the Isthmus from
I Colombian rule, the bul1ding of an inter-oceanic canal, and Bunau-Var1lla's
 
earning a $40 million personal profit. 3
 
I With Bunau-Varilla acting as special envoy, the Panamanian
 
I
 
delegation made an agreement with the Roosevelt Administration whereby
 
the U.S. would provide ml1itary assistance to ensure a successful revolt
 
and, in return, the newly independent Republic of Panama would sign a
 
treaty granting the U.S. the right to construct an inter-oceanic canal across
I the narrow isthmus ofthe new nation-state. The delegation returned to
 
Panama and witnessed the independence of their country on November 2,
I 1903. 4 Washington had fulfilled its obllgation. The time had arrived for
 
Panama to commit to the treaty.
I In 1903 U.S. Secretary of State John Hay and Panamanian "Envoy
 
ExtraordInary and Minister Plenipotentiary" Philippe Bunau-Var1l1a signed
 
I the Hay-Bunau-Var111a Convention (McCullough, 387-388). Amador,
 
I
 
Arango, Arosemena, Arias, and Boyd gave Bunau-Varilla the authority to
 
act on Panama's behalf but within specific limits:
 
First, no deals could be made that affected 'the
I sovereignty of Panama which was free,
 States should pledge to uphold the new nation's
 
'sovereignty, territorial integrity, and public
 
I
 
I order'....Third, a canal treaty would be drafted, but
 
only after consultation with Amador and Boyd.
 
(LaFeber, I 989, 28-29)
 
Bunau-Vari lla, who was motivated by the desire for fame, fai led to adhereI to any of the nationals instructions (McCullough, 277). Instead, he 
I 
4 
I 
I 
I deliberately kept the rebel delegation waiting in New York while in 
Washington he proceeded to redraft Secretary Hay's treaty proposal, which 
I was similar in language to the Hay-Herran Treaty. However, Bunau­
I 
Varilla's version (which became the final treaty) gave a broader grant of 
power to the United States (McCullough 1977, 392).5 The treaty required 
the U.S. to pay Panama $10 million for canal construction and a $250,000
 
annuity, but Article 3 of the treaty also gave the United States "all the
 I rights, power, and authority within the zone...which the United States
 
would possess and exercise If it were the sovereign of the territory... to
I the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any 
sovereign rights, power or authority" (McCullough, 393). This provision 
I permitted formation of a United States colony within Panama and was the 
I 
first among several which transformed the newly independent country into 
a U.S. protectorate. 
In addition to Article 3, Article 1 specified that "The United States 
guarantees and wi 11 maintain the independence of the Republ ic of I Panama", thus giving the United States a basis for intervention (Mecham, 
313). Through Article 3 the U.S. had been provided the right to maintain a I permanent presence within the country and to govern the canal zone in 
accordance with U.S. laws and interests. Article I only served to extend I the United States right to act as if it were sovereign to the whole of 
Panama. Then, with Article 136 of the 1904 Panamanian Constitution 
I (which was modeled after the U.S. Constitution) the idea of sovereignty 
I 
was solidified with the right of intervention (LaFeber, 1989,33; Nyrop, 
23). The article "gave the United States the right to intervene, in any part 
I 
of Panama, to reestablish public peace and constitutional order" (LaFeber, 
1989, 33). According to Nyrop, "[Panama] became a de facto protectorate 
of the [United States] through [Articles 1 and 136]" (23). Still, the 
mention of sovereignty in Article 3 was the crucial component, for itI established the formal pol1tical presence of the United States in Panama. 
Other provisions of the Treaty, specifically Articles II, IV, V, VII, and 
I 
I XII, further supported Bunau-Varilla's claim that the "The Republic of 
Panama is henceforth under the protection of the United States" 
(McCullough, 395). These provisions permitted the United States to 
pervade all facets of Panamanian 1ife--political, economic, and social. 
I 5 
I 
I 
I Articles II and IV granted perpetual occupation and use of Panamanian land 
and waters (LaFeber, 1989, 35-36). In addition, "Article VII 
I provided the power to take by right of eminent domain needed lands, 
I 
bUildings, or water rights in Panama City and Colon, and to intervene in 
those cities, if necessary, to preserve public order" (36) (Mecham, 313). 
The provisions undoubtedly allowed the United States to determine in 
larger measure what regions of the country were populated,I what regions were economically developed, and what political policies 
threatened public order. Furthermore, Article V gave the U.S. total control I over Panamanian communications, and Article XII gave the Canal Company 
command of immigration (LaFeber, 1989, 36), As a consequence, the U.S. 
I possessed the power to regulate both the dissemination of information and 
I 
the racial composition of the new country. There was not time for an 
independent, sovereign Panamanian identity to be formed. Within a year of 
its independence the Republic had become no more than a Central American 
outpost of the United States.I Early on, Panama's cItizens questioned the rIght of the U.S. to act as if 
it were sovereIgn both Inside and outsIde the Canal Zone. "The PanamanianI government objected to the establishment of ports, customs houses, and 
tariffs by the United States, argUing that such concessions would ruIn 
I 
I Panama's commerce and, moreover, would Infringe Panama's sovereignty 
over the Canal Zone" (Mecham, 316). At fIrst washington dealt wIth the 
complaints in a patronizing manner. The Theodore Roosevelt 
I 
Administration claImed that Panamanian sovereignty in the Canal Zone was 
merely "titular"; the United States, possessed "the equivalent of 
sovereignty over the canal strIp". Nevertheless, Washington assured the 
Panamanians that this "eqUivalent" sovereignty did not mean theI colonIzation of the Zone (LaFeber, 1989,34). 
The U.S. administration's demands for compliance In response to otherI Panamanian protests, hOwever, Indicated a dIfferent interpretation of U.S. 
and Panamanian sovereignty. From washington's viewpoint, U.S. 
I sovereignty in the zone was all-encompassing, and for a very good reason; 
I 
Panama's was non-existent. The U.S., in accordance with the Roosevelt 
Corollary of 1904, was on a "'civilizing' mission" to prevent European 
influence In the Western Hemisphere and to tutor the "wicked and 
I 
6 
I 
I 
I
 inefficient type" (from Roosevelt's viewpoint, any non-caucasian ).
 
I
 
Therefore, Panama, with its highly mestizo, mulatto, and black population,
 
was to be aprimary target of Roosevelt's belief (LaFeber, 1989,43-44).
 
Provisions of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903 and the
 
Constitution of 1904 sealed the fate of Panama and its citizens.
 I Panamanians did not have any Involvement in the drafting or signing of the
 
first document, nor did they have direct involvement in deciding the
I content of the second. The United States utilized its power to tempt
 
Panama to choose independence or continuance of Colombian rule (LaFeber,

I 1989,3Q). By 1904 the foundation of the protectorate was firmly in
 
place, and Panamanians could not eliminate what was to become a lasting
 
I
 U.S. presence.
 
I 
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 CHAPTER J
 
I 
THE HISTORICAL BASES Of PANAMANIAN POLITICAL, 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL STRUCTURES 
I 
I They have not the first elements of good or free 
government. Arbitrary power, military, and 
ecclesiastical, was stamped upon their habits, 
I 
and upon all their institutions. 6 
John Quincy Adams' 
Characteristic of	 most Latin American nation-states is the triarchy ofI the military, the Church and the hacendado class or landed elite (Mecham, 
15). These institutions, in a historically symbiotic relationship, have 
I wielded a great degree of influence, maintaining control of the political, 
I 
social, and economic systems of the country. 7 The landed oligarchy, 
composed of a predominantly white upper-class and supported by the 
military, has occupied the primary power position, generally determining 
all other social, economic, and political structures. In addition toI	 supporting the rural oligarchy, the military has taken as its most 
important responsibility maintenance of the established order, and theI	 military's commitment to order is near absolute. Moreover, the armed 
forces of Latin American have been will ing to defy the interests of the 
I 
I hacendados and depose oligarchically-controlled governments if it has 
resulted in the maintenance of order. The Church has performed its natural 
role of spiritual guidance and traditionally has not challenged either the 
I 
oligarchic dominance or the Qualities of ml11tarily-jmposed order. 8 
Ahistory of conformance to these roles, however, has not resulted in 
consistently favorable Latin American relations with the United States. 
The dominant oligarchy, the strong military, and the passive Church--in theI case of Central American and Caribbean states--have contributed to the 
development of what LaFeber calls "neo-dependency" (1983, 16). ThisI concept grows out of original dependency theory. So-called neo-dependent 
countries are not only SUbjugated to "the economic strength...of the leading
I powers", but are also Subject to military interventions by "those leading 
I 8 
I 
I 
I
 powers" (LaFeber 1983, 17-18). Central American countries in neo­
dependent relationships with the United States tend to have the following 
are characteristics: monocultural economies, oligarchies sUbservient to I U.S. interests, and militaries backed by Washington (1983,17>. These 
characteristics ensure that small nation-states are malleable and willingI	 to ignore their domestic interests in order to comply with those of the 
United States. I Although Panama does not share all the characteristics or neo­
dependence (it has a more diversified economy than other Central American 
I nation-states, for example), its internal political, economic, and social 
I 
structures suggest a long-term historic neo-dependence on the United 
States. The traditional landed oligarchy has fulfilled its characteristic 
role of making political, economic, and social decisions. Panamanian 
politics are characterized by a strong military presence. The military hasI	 given support to those clvi I ian leaders who have worked Within the 
established order; it has deposed those who threatened order and theI	 military's power to impose It. The Church, however, has not taken an 
active role in political, economic, and social Issues: 
I 
Weak organization, the small number of parish 
priests, and the even smaller number of 
I 
I Panamanian parish priests generally prevented 
the development of strong hierarchical positions on 
social and political Issues. (Nyrop, 158) 
In the late 1960s the military assumed a superior position In theI traditional triarchy. With the appointment or General Omar TorrijoS as 
"Supreme Leader of the Panamanian Revolution", military and politicalI leadership were united. Since this merger, the Panamanian military 
(called at first the National Guard and later the Panamanian Defense Force) 
I has controlled virtually all political life, linking itself with the 
I 
Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD)--or any other party that perceived 
the military as a required partner. In the decade of the 1980s, despite the 
presence of puppet President Eric Arturo Devalle, the trend continued 
under the rule of General Manuel Antonio Noriega, Torrijos' successor. I Governments representing mi Iitary and oligarchy interests have maintained 
I 9 
I 
I 
I long-term leases of Panamanian territory for what has been perceived in 
I 
washington at least as a permanent military presence for the U.S. 9 
Therefore, Panama fulfills the last two criteria of neo-dependency, a 
compliant military and an oligarchy receptive to U.S. interests. 
In the same vein, Panamanian economic and social systems are highlyI dependent on U.S. interests. The primary source of governmental revenue 
is the Panama Canal. Since its inauguration in 1914, the Panamanians haveI been sUbject to U.S. interests as crystallized in a whole succession of 
Canal Treaties. In addition to the Canal, Panama also gains revenue from 
I its export of bananas, sugar, and coffee. According to LaFeber, these 
particular crops are never profitable for any Central American nation­
I state given that they are priced according to "an international marketplace 
I 
which the industrial powers [such as the United States) ...can control" 
(1983,17). Thus, Panama's economic system is virtually monocultural 
and not particularly profitable at that. The country's use of the U.S. dollar 
as its legal currency is a symbol of its non-sovereign status. This,I together with its involvement in the world banking industry, increases the
 
vulnerability of its economic system to the vagaries of the international
I market and U.S.-commanded Panamanian behavior within it.
 
Although not primary characteristics in LaFeber's development of neo­

I dependency, racial and class characteristics are also significant bases
 
I
 
upon which the country has developed into an informal protectorate.
 
LaFeber describes the racial and class consciousness of early Panama,
 
after the construction of the Canal: 
I 
I The racial composition was complex and potentially 
dangerous. At the top of the socio-political­
economic ladder stood approximately 51,000 
I 
'whites' whose largely Spanish ancestry made them 
Whiter than most other Panamanians. The leadersI of this group came from several dozen, often 
interrelated families that comprised the oligarchy. 
(1989,49)10 
I
 
I 10 
I 
I 
I Therefore, because a whlte bloodllne and wealth were conducive and economic power, the standard of "white is right, ana Blacks go to the 
back" was strictly applied (LaFeber 1989,50). Consequently, mestizosI and mulattos, the majority racial groups, were excluded from both the 
political and economic processes and comprised the lower socioeconomicI stratum.
 
A racially and socially divisive social system was reinforced by the
 
I
 
I practice of segregation in the Canal Zone. During construction of the
 
Canal, the zone adm1nistration adapted the U.S. segregation system to the
 
Canal housing, schools, hospitals, and the pay scale (McCullough, 472).
 
Panamanians and blacks, who had come from the West Indies or the United 
States, received their wages from the silver roll while white I laborers received their pay from the gold roll (472). 11 The use of two 
payrolls emphasized the difference between the valuable gold currency andI Its lesser valued counterpart (472). LaFeber notes that Panamanians 
deeply resented this and other practices which according to PanamanianI opinion, had grouped them together wIth the lowest classes of society 
(LaFeber 1989, 52). 12 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 11 
I 
I
 
I
 
I 
CHAPTER 4 
FACTORS IN U.S. DOMINANCE OVER PANAMA 
Despite the history of racial and socIal dIvIsion in Panama, a dIstInct I form of naUonal unity known as PanameQlsmo exists. PanamanIan 
nationalIsm orIginated In pre-Canal times, when the country was aI province of New Granada (present-day Colombia) and was the rallying force 
for oppositIon to Colombian rule until Panama's Independence In 1903 
I 
I (LaFeber 1989, 10,20). This unity was based on the great "geographical 
myth--the belIef that PanamanIans were predestined to control the 
crossroads of the world" (20). In addition to thIs belief, It followed that 
I 
an anti-imperIalIst sentIment developed toward both ColombIa and the 
UnIted States (20). This early natIonalIsm was later formalIzed Into 
modern PanameOismo. "government by Panamanians for the happIness of the 
Panamanian people," as announced by President Arnulfo Arias in 1940I (LaFeber 1989, 74). 
PanamanIan wariness concerning what was perceived to beI Imperialism was, of course, not Without cause. According to LaFeber, 
emergence of the geographical myth coincided wIth Washington's
I IntroductIon of a deterministic policy based on Manifest Destiny and the 
I 
White Man's Burden (1989, 20). Together, these two concepts resulted In 
the following perception of Latin America and LatIn Americans: 
I The UnIted States is superior to the Latin AmerIcan 
nations and carries the right and the moral obliga­
tIon to spread Its benign Influence among theI backward peoples of the southern contInent. 
(WIlliams 1971, 18) 
I 
I 
Panama's vIew of the U.S. as a ptentlal colonizing power was to be 
Increasingly JustIfied by Washlngton's behavIor. ThIs foresight, however, 
I 
did not prevent the United States from securing those clauses In the 1903 
Treaty which gave It "power over Panama's economy, Immigration, city 
I 12 
I 
I 
I 
services, and foreign pol icy" (LaFeber 1989, 54). From the time of the 
signing of the 1903 treaty to the present, Washington has fulfilled its 
destiny, "asserting [its assumed] racial and cultural superiority over [what 
it has viewed as] a materially mferior native majority" While discountingI the importance of PanameO'ista fervor (LaFeber 1989, 53). 
The 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty also allowed opportunity for total I economic domination or Panama by the United States. As a province of 
Colombia, Panama was a center for American investment--The United FruitI Company and Central and South American Telegraph, for example (LaFeber 
1989, 60) (McCullough 1977,399). The completion of the Canal in 1914, 
I however, initiated a more complicated economic relationship between the 
I 
two nation-states than had ever been imagined. The Canal encouraged an 
influx of new American investments: 
I By 1930, North Americans held nearly $29 
mill ion in direct investments and $18 mi 11 ion 
in Panamanian bonds. [Also] the UnitedI	 States provided more than two-thirds of 
the nation's $19 mi 11 ion imports and took 
94 percent of its $ 4 million in exports.I	 CLaFeber 1989, 62) 
I 
I Prosperity in the United States was inextricably linked with Panamanian 
prosperity, or the reverse, as seen in the stock market crash of 1929. inI the aftermath, Panama experienced a high level of unemployment and 
an increase in racial tension. In 1931 the emerging Panamanian middle 
class, composed of mestiZO professionals who were motivated by the 
I 
damaging effects of the Canal Zone monopoly, led a successful coup 
against the Arosemena government. 13 They were reacting to years of U.S. 
monopoly in the Canal Zone. "In [the middle class's] view the United 
States-subsidized commissaries in the Zone robbed merchants of sales,I discriminated against Panamanian workers, and humiliated their country's 
government" (LaFeber 1989,64). Throughout the history of Canal ZoneI trade, Panamanians viewed the U.S, monopoly over Zone commissaries as 
I 
I 13 
I 
I 
I 
being directly correlated with the country's sluggish economy (Mecham, 
3' 16). 
Contemporary economic dependency on the United States Is also 
centered on the Canal. In 1987 Panama received $4 bIllion in U.S.I investments and in 1988 $1.1 million in U.S. aid (Sawyer). In addition, the 
United States paid Panama its treaty-mandated $10,000,000 annuity for I operation of the Canal. Compared to conditions In the 1920s, the Panama 
of the 1980s prospered well in economic terms from its relationship with 
I the United States. In fact, "[n]early one-fifth of Panama's imports were
 
from the U.S. While more than one-third of its exports went to the U.S.
 
I (Quigley). Then In 1988 the period of monocultural wealth was halted
 
I 
when U.S. President Reagan utilized the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act to place sanctions on Panama. The sanctions, aimed at the 
person and government of strong-man Manuel Noriega, prohibited any 
payments by the United States government or by U.S. companies to Panama.I washington intended for the sanctions to act as a pressure tactic, forcing 
Panamanians to depose Noriega. Instead they merely led to heightenedI Panamanian national ism and virtual economic demise of the country. 
The almost immediate diSintegration of the economy was a direct 
I result of the restrictlOns caused by the sanctions. American businesses in 
I 
Panama (approximately 450) could not pay taxes or telephone and electrical 
bills (U.S. Congress, House, 1988,39). In addition, the ban deprived the 
Panamanian government of U.S. aid, and a court order froze Panamanian 
government assets in U.S. banks. The government was thereby deprived ofI $375 million dollars (Morganthau, 24-25). Sanctions added to the 
already weakening economic condition which had begun to surface in theI	 latter half of the eighties. The once productive banking Industry was 
experiencing capital flight (U.S. Congress, House, 1988, 105). "The annualI GDP growth rate fell from 4.7% in 1985 to 2.9% in 1986...and was probably 
zero in 1987 (U.S. Congress, House, 1988,42). The unemployment rate in 
I 1986 was 10.2 %and about 14% at the time of the sanctions' 
I 
implementation (De Ctlrdoba, A11). In fact, the Panamanian Minister of 
Economic Planning foresaw the "[dismissal] of between 20,000 and 30,000 
I 
public sector employees out of a total of 150,000..... (U.S. Congress, House, 
1988, 37J. The Panamanian government lacked a sufficient amount of 
I
 14 
I 
I 
I	 national currency, the U.S. dollar, to pay them (37). 
I 
The combined effect of the already weakening economy and U.S. 
sanctions prompted the Panamanian people to turn on the notoriously 
I 
corrupt Noriega government. A large number of citizens temporarily put 
aside traditional racial and socioeconomic tensions in an attempt to oust 
General Noriega who, like his predecessor, the popular General Torrijos, 
capitalized on the divisiveness characterizing Panamanian society.I Noriega assumed the role of Lfder Maximo and gained vast support from 
lower class blacks and mestizos, offering them employment in the white­I dominated pol1tical and economic systems (U.S. Congress, House, 1988, 
85). It was the closure of banks, unpaid pensions, a high unemployment 
I rate, and the lack of food and medicines, however, that motivated these 
I 
long-time supporters to side with the anti-Noriega National Civic Crusade 
or to abstain from pomica] action altogether (U.S. Congress, House, 
1988,104) 14 The opposition, facing a determined Noriega, sought a 
"concerted and committed action from the U.S. Administration" to rid themI	 of the General (105). They relied on the historic relationship between 
Panama and the United States to elicit an interventionary response fromI	 washington. 
I	 The National Security State 
I	 An understanding of U.S.-Panamanian relations is only possible by 
understanding general U.S. policy toward Latin America. For over a 
century, Washington has viewed and continues to view Latin AmericanI nation-states as crucial for U.S. national security. The following 
discussion examines the concept of the national security state (with I	 emphasis on its inception and its meaning during the Reagan 
Administration) with specific reference to Panama. 15I United States-Latin American relations can be traced to the early 
eighteenth century. Later, in the aftermath of the Civil War, the United 
I States, assuming the deterministic posture of Manifest Destiny, became 
I 
the dominant force in the hemisphere. From the North American 
perspective, Latin American nation-states belonged geographically, 
politically, and CUlturally to the Western Hemisphere. The so-called 
I 15 
I 
I 
"Western Hemisphere Idea" described the concept of countries of both theI North and soun, as having become "a community of neighbors sharing 
common interest and ideals" (Mecham, 85) However, the SouthernI	 neighbors' lack of democratic institutions obligated their powerful 
Northern neighbor, to give them guidance (Williams, 19).I This belief, while only partially explaining the pronouncement of the 
Monroe Doctrine, certainly brought forth (in 1903) the RooseveIt Corollary 
I to that Doctrine, the latter being the pronouncement with which the United 
I 
States claimed the right to exercise its military power to prevent European 
intervention in the Western Hemisphere (Mecham, 68). According to 
LaFeber, the U.S. formally announced its imperialistic character through 
the speech and actions of Theodore Roosevelt (1989,41). As a result, I Latin American nation-states, particularly those in the Central America 
and Caribbean, were partners in what Williams calls the U.S. policy of I "defensive imperialism." The United States would deter any aggressive 
acts by European powers by means of deterring Latin America from 
I 
I committing any acts that would attract European intervention (Williams, 
23). Hence, the fear of Europe as the alien "outsider" compelled the U.S. to 
control Latin America as one might control a child whose behavior 
I 
threatened disorder on the part of others (LaFeber 1989, 41). Any 
country not under the direct tutelage of the United States was, in 
Washington's view, SUbject to instantaneous revolution (LaFeber 1989, 
25)I The location of the Canal placed panama among those nation-states 
viewed by the U.S. as being most important to its national security. I Wasrlington believed that "if unfriendly, powerful Europeans [like tl)e 
Germans or the British] settled in one part of the Caribbean, their 
I influence could spread until the Canal would be endangered" (LaFeber 1989, 
I 
42). So, I ike other countries in the region--e.g., Cuba and Nicaragua-­
Panama became the target of U,S, intervention when Washington perceived 
the slightest internal disorder, For instance, in 1918, four years after the 
completion of the Canal, U,S, troops intervened in response to rioting overI a rigged election and occupied Chiriqui province for two years (LaFeber 
\989,58; Nyrop, 27). Military intervention was a long-term means ofI ensuring that the nation-states of me South did not risk the physlcal 
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I 
security of the HemIsphere or Impede UnIted States polley (Mecham, 287l. 
More than seventy years later, U.S. assumptions about Latin American 
countries appeared not to have changed at all, and the International 
political system was stIli dIstinctly bipolar. The conflIct between the U.S.I and Europe as would be expansionist powers through the nineteenth and 
into the twentieth centuries continued in the Latin American arena; onlyI the actors were different (Mecham, 462). From the Reagan 
Administration's viewpoint, the Monroe Doctrine had to be revived. The 
I 
I Soviet UnIon had replaced Great Britain and Germany as the Old World 
power which threatened U.S. national security (Mecham, 54). Therefore, 
tutelage of Latin American nation-states was still necessary, for 
somehow the countries of the South had not mastered democracy (as 
defined by U.S. State Department experts). North AmerIca was obligated toI	 continue in its role as world policeman to keep "outsiders" from 
threatening the Hemisphere, and Central and Caribbean States were onceI	 again major forces In a posture of defensive Imperial ism (LaFeber 1989, 
41; Wtlllams, 23). PresIdent Reagan stated "Central AmerIca Is AmerIca.I It's at our doorstep" (Schoultz, 38). The United States was continuing its 
mission--now in terms of the Cold War--to keep the SOViet Union and its 
I political doctrines from reaching the Hemisphere. U.S. Latin American 
I 
foreIgn policy in became characterIzed by a paranoId fear of communist 
ideological and/or political presence. According to the Reagan 
administration, any instabi Iity within LatIn America would leave a vacuum 
that the communists would be more than willing to fill.I Just as It viewed other other Central American and CarIbbean states, 
the Administration valued Panama as an important actor in its hemisphericI "fortress" polIcy. The nation-state has figured highly in the global 
balance of power, not only because of the Canal, but also for its being the 
I 
I site of U. S. military bases which would be of value in the keeping the 
region militarily free of a communist presence. Since 1913, the United 
States has maintained a military command center for Latin America in 
Panama, the United States Southern Command or SOUTHCOM (Schoultz, 
166). The center defends the Canal and furthers U.S. military InfluenceI throughout the region through "supervision of military aid programs, the 
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I 
support of military assistance groups....and the coordination of inter-
American training exercises", The country has ten U.S, military 
installation occupied by a total of 10,300 U,S, military personnel (Sawyer), 
For over thirty years, Panama was the home of the School of the Americas,I aU,S, mllitary training center for Latin American forces, and it is the 
location of the Inter-American Air Force Academy (Schoultz, 167),I Facllities like these have enabled the United States to have a direct 
presence in the region in order to look for signs of instabil ity andI communist threat. 
The U,S. has further implanted itself in Panama through its influence 
I over the national mi Iitary, The Hay-Bunau-Vari lla Treaty provided the 
I 
foundation for U.S, development of the country's military, Nyrop cites 
the U,S, dissolution of the Panamanian army in 1904 as an example of the 
I 
degree of North American control from the earliest times (Nyrop, 27), At 
the request of President Amador, who characterized his army as aI "'Frankenstein' ... only the North Americans could control. , . ,", U,S. 
officials ordered that the country's army be eliminated, "PanamanianI arms and ammunition were placed in the Canal Zone under U.S, control. For 
the next quarter-century, the country depended on a 700-to 1000-member 
I pollee force and the United States military for Its internal security" (LaFeber 1989, 39). 
This same control later manifested itself in the training of the 
I 
Panamanian National Guard (later known as the Panamanian Defense Force), 
In the School of the Americas, 16 According to LaFeber, .... , [the School of 
Americas] produced 34,000 graduates by the mid-1970s. The Panamanian 
Guard provided 3500, or the fourth highest number of these graduates, ' , , ,"I (1989, 132; Nyrop 1980, 20 n The school's "courses taught military 
officers to forget the old caudilljsmo and Instead make their countryI immune to communism, not to enrich their bankrolls" (LaFeber 1989, 132), 
The Guard was the enforcing body of General Omar Torrijos who in 1968 
I assumed maximum leadership in Panama. Torrijos and the Panamanian 
I 
National Guard were Washington's assurance that any instability Which 
might threaten the national security state could be instantly suppressed, 
I
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I 
I The Torrijos government censored the country's media and outlawed free 
I 
speech, political parties and the National Assembly (LaFeber 1989, 132) 
(Nyrop 1980, 151). After TorrijoS'S death in 1981, General Manuel 
Antonio Noriega, his successor, continued this tradition. Noriega, 
however, would cause the Reagan Administration--which in the 1980s wasI actively opposing Nicaragua's Sandinlsta's through clandestine aid to the 
Contras--to question its support of a strong Panamanian mi Iitary underI such a person as Manuel Noriega. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I CHAPTER 5 
OPERAnON JUST CAUSE: ANTECEDENTSI 
I Cocaine the cancer In the Panamanian Defense Force has metastasized. 
They have been at It for 20 years. 17I 
Jack H. Vaughn, Former U.S. Ambassador to 
Panama, in his testimony to the U.S. HouseI Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs 
I 
I Rediscovery of NQriega 
I Washington's relationship with Noriega spanned almost four decades. 
As a young military cadet (and later as a member of the National Guard),I Noriega served as a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) informant (Salholz, 
15). Throughout his military training he spied on classmates suspected ofI leftist leanings. As a Guard officer he concentrated on collecting 
information on Cuba for the CIA At the same time, General TorrijoS
I recognized him as a loyal friend, and Noriega steadily climbed the ranks of 
I 
the Guard command. His usefulness to the United States endured through 
both Republican and Democratic administrations. LaFeber states that 
"[Noriega] passed on such useful information to intelligence officials during 
the 1950s and 1960s that the CIA made him one of its 'assets'" (1989,195).I His privileged status remained intact, despite CIA Director George Bush's 
confirmation, in mid-1970, that Noriega was an intelligence agent for bothI the United States and Cuba (Parry, 16). In addition to his spying 
activities, the Panamanian was involved in the drug trade. However,
I Noriega's value--according to Washington--outweighed any offenses he 
I 
committed against the United States or Panamanian society 
That value doubled when Noriega became de facto leader of Panama in 
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I 
1983. After the 1981 death of General Omar Torrijos, the PanamanianI National Guard was to operate on a rotational command system: 
I In 1982 the four top officers of the National Guard 
agreed on a plan for rotational command of the guardI among themselves, with each outgoing commander taking up a position of power within the PRD. 
[Each of the four officers was to have an opportunityI	 to be the head of the National Guard]. (Robinson 
1989,189)18
I 
In 1983, however, NorIega changed the rules when he assumed complete
I control of the Panamanian government. Following the tradition, he moved 
I 
to fortify the National Guard and continued to take a percentage of the 
country's revenue as personal gain (U,S. Congress, House, 1988, 8), He 
transformed the Guard Into the 15,000-man PanamanIan Defense Forces 
(PDF) which functioned as both ml1itary and police. PanamaniansI	 
. associated the PDF with its corrupt activities--i.e" drug traffIcking, 
money laundering, arms smugglIng, and illegal trade. The force was well­I known for its DignIty Battalions and, partIcularly, Its anti-rIot squad 
called the Dobermans (RobInson 190). With the aid of the PDF, Noriega had 
I 
I complete control of Panama and for some PanamanIans, this control lay in 
the hands of a "strange, twisted, scary" individual (U.S, Congress, House, 
1988, 11). 
I 
For the Reagan administration, Manuel Noriega's behavior was 
secondary. The General was a crucial actor in the Administration's 
Nicaraguan polley. Throughout the 1980s WaShington was preoccupied 
with the NIcaraguan Sandlnlsta government which It sought to counter wHhI its proxIes, the "Contras. U.S, offIcIals, particularly President Reagan, 
perceived Contra victory as the key to institutIng democratic government­I -that Is, one receptive to U.S. interests--in the country. To ensure that 
NIcaragua would come under the control of the Contras, the United States 
I executed clandestine missions under the direction of NatIOnal Security 
Council aide Oliver North, 
I 
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I 
North's willing partner was General Noriega who carried out tasks 
I for the Administration even after the U.S. Congress banned military 
I 
assistance to the Contras. Kempe describes Noriega's involvement in the 
bombing of Nicaraguan military facilities; such was done to demonstrate 
the pervasiveness and power of the Contra organization (20). Noriega also 
offered "to murder Nicaraguan leaders on Washington's behalf", and for aI salary of $185,000 per year, the General leased his country as a shipment 
center for arms and money (Kempe, 22).I In addition to these activities, LaFeber has described Noriega's 
purposeful efforts to destroy the Contadora Peace Plan at the urging of the 
I United States. The Plan, which called for a cessation of military 
activities, "threatened both to take Initiative in the region out of 
I Washington's hands and to leave the Sandinistas in power in Nicaragua" 
I 
(LaFeber 1989, 200). By 1984--the year of the Boland Amendment which 
"cut off military aid to the Contras"--the Panamanian dictator was 
Washington's last hope for ousting Daniel Ortega's Sandinistas (Kempe, 24). 
Noriega was well aware of this factor and fatefully assumed that he wasI	 indispensable to the United States (Robinson, 191). Therefore, when he 
refused to continue to assist the Reagan Administration, he did not realize I	 that he had pushed U.S. officials to the limits. 
I	 The Reagan posit jon 
I	 Noriega's lack of cooperation signalled Washington that an old. friendship had gone sour, but before terminating the relationship, the 
Administration attempted to salvage it. In 1985 "both CIA DirectorI	 William Casey and [National Security Council) Chief John Poindexter [began] 
to pressure Noriega to clean up his act..." (Morganthau, 36). To these two I	 men the redemption of Noriega--who had been a friend to both the CIA, NSC, 
and the DEA--meant the chance to succeed in Nicaragua (36). The 
I	 Panamanian ignored U.S. pressure, leaving Washington divided over the next 
course of action. Then the release of a New york Times article in 1986, 
I 
I describing Noriega's alleged involvement in cocaine trafficking, exposed 
the nature of the crisis but in simplistic terms. North Americans were 
faced with the image of the _ U.S. battling the Qill1 Central American 
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I drug dealer. 
Despite the publication of the article, some U.S. bureaucrats stillI favored the U.S.-Noriega relationship. LaFeber states that "Even after U.S.
 
officials, no dOUbt led by Poindexter, publ icly raised the pressure on
 
I Noriega to step down, they continued to praise him for cooperating with the
 
I
 
DEA" (1989, 203). Unti I 1987 the Reagan Administration continued to
 
debate about maintaining Noriega. Members of the CIA and Defense
 
Department took sides against the State Department which from the
 
beginning viewed the dictator as rep laceable (Robinson 1989, 191). From
I 1987 untll the end of President Reagan's term, the Administration used a
 
series of measures to push Noriega out of Panama, none of which were
I successful.
 
Before Washington could make its first diplomatic overtures, unrest
 
I
 
I occurred in Panama, Members of the National Civic Crusade (NCO, a
 
citizens' group led by white upper- and middle-class Panamanians, rallied
 
to show their "discontent with PDF corruption and Noriega" (RObinson, 191).
 
I
 
The leader retaliated with acts of violence aimed at both the United States
 
and the NCe:
 
Noriega organized a street march of 5,000 followers,

I who smashed windows and stoned vehicles at the U.S.
 embassy, then overturned a statue of [Theodore RooseveltJ
 
...The General Imprisoned up to 600 opponents in July
 
I
 
I alone, whtle street clashes with this forces led to at
 
at least one death and over 1,000 injuries. (LaFeberI989,
 
205).
 
I 
With the internal turmoil in Panama now exposed to the world, WaShingtonI apparently had justification for lts subsequent actions. The 
Administration assumed that it would appear as a saviour to theI Panamanian people. 19 
The Reagan Administration initially approached Noriega in an 
unassuming manner, but as the dictator showed no sign of cooperating, the 
Administration gradually increased the pressure. First, "in December 
[1988J Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage flew to Panama to tellI Noriega he had to go. Somehow, that message did not get through" 
(Morganthau, 36). Consequently, the U.S. sent a second message onI 
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I 
I	 February 4, 1988, when a Florida grand jury charged Noriega for the following activities: 
I	 [giving] assistance in transshipment of drugs from 
Colombia to the [U.S.], laundering drug profits in 
I
 
I Panama-based banks in return for a payoff, [granting]
 
permission to set up cocaine processing plants... , and
 
the sale of ether and acetone to the drug cartel.
 
(Robinson, 191). 
I	 According to Bernal, the indictment was another poorly planned U.S. effort 
(U.S. Congress, House, 1988, 151), Bernal's analysis has merit because theI indictment only precipitated yet another U.S. action. 
Following the indictment, the U.S. decided to act in closer proximity to 
I Noriega. Assistant Secretary of State Ell iot Abrams held secret meeting 
I 
with Noriega's puppet president, Eric Arturo Delvalle and encouraged him 
to release Noriega as the PDF Commander (Pichirallo 16). When Delvalle 
attempted to fire Noriega on February 25, 1988, the General responded by 
firing Delvalle and replacing him with Manuel Sol(s Palma. In turn, theI	 United States refused to recognize the Solfs Palma government and 
conceded to the newly exiled Delvalle's request to freeze PanamanianI revenues (Robinson, 193). The Administration appeared desperate, for as 
Bernal emphasizes, "President Eric Arturo Delvalle [had been] a Noriega
I puppet [only] a few weeks ago" <U.S. Congress, House, 188, lSI), 
I 
Month after month Noriega and washington continued the battle of 
wills. In March Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Walker and 
legal adviser Michael Kozak traveled to Panama to offer Noriega a deal: the 
I U.S. would not extradite Noriega to stand trial if he would go immediately into exlle. The General refused the deal. On March 16, 1980, the leader 
faced and put down a coup attempt led by Colonel Leonidas Macias and hisI troops (Robinson, 193). The following month President Reagan utilized 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act "to ban payments toI	 Noriega's government"; this ban prohibIted U.S. companies and Us. citizens 
residing in Panama from making any payments to the Panamanian 
I 
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government ("U.S. Ban") (U.S. Congress, House, 1988, 89; See also ChapterI IV, "Factors In U.S. DomInance"). AlthOugh thIs ban In combInation with a 
suspension of Panama's favored trade status and economic aid only further 
I weakened the country's economy, NorIega still rejected a second U.S. deal. 
I 
In May 1988 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Michael Kozak 
returned to Panama wIth another proposal: the U.S. would drop the drug 
I 
indictments if Noriega would resign on August 12, 1988 and go Into exIle. 
After NorIega's departure, U.S. aid to Panama would resume (Galloway 28).I Once again the leader refused. PrIor to Kozak's leaving, the U.S. Senate 
passed "an amendment prohibiting any negotiatlons wIth Noriega thatI would include quashing the Miami indictment" (Morganthau 1988, 39). The 
Administration had, indeed, reached a stalemate in resolving the crisis.I Even In Its last days the Reagan Administration attempted to remedy the 
situatIon. 
In July the Administration considered sponsoring another coup whiCh 
I 
would have been sanctioned by President Reagan's Covert Action Finding 
("Reagan"). Officials did not follow through with the plan because the 
Department of Defense voIced concerns about its effect on the future of 
U.S. military base placement in Central America ("Reagan"). Yet, theI Administration acted paradoxically in August 1988 when it did not include 
Noriega on a list to countries with "heads of state senior governmentI officIals Involved in drug trafficking"--as required by the 1986 Anti-Drug 
Act ("U.S. Drops"). According to WaShington, Noriega was not listed 
I because he was not the legitimate head of Panamanian government ("U.S. 
I 
Drops"). Perhaps the U.S. officials considered the omission as a formal 
retraction of the drug indictment which would coax Noriega to cooperate. 
I 
Regardless of the intent, the strong man remained firmly in place, a 
problem pending for the next U.S. president. 
The Bush ResponseI 
By the time of his election, George Bush, Vice President during theI Reagan Administration, understood the nature of the Panamanian crisis. He 
knew of the dissension among key administrative agenCies concerning a 
I resolution of the issue. In fact. during the last days of his vice presidency, 
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I	 he contributed to the discord by openly opposing President Reagan's final 
offer to negotiate with Manuel Noriega (Morganthau 1988, 36). However,I	 BuSh's decision to approach the situation differently did not give him any 
added advantage. Like Reagan he faced a determined Noriega, who 
I 
I continued to draw support from Panamanians through generation of anti­
Yankee sentiment <Branigin 18). Moreover, the new president also found 
that the past discord of the Reagan Administration carried over into his 
I 
own. 
President Bush faced four pressing issues: (1) the continuance of 
economic sanctions; (2) the upcoming Panamanian election; (3) the need to 
appoint a Panamanian Canal administrator; and (4) the expiration of I recognized Panamanian President Eric Arturo Delvalle's term (August 1989) 
(Branigin 18). The President attempted to respond to these with policies I in accordance with the U.S. "objective of removing General Noriega, 
reforming the Panamanian Defense Forces, and removing them from 
I politics" through U.S. assistance of the Panamanian people (U.S. Congress, 
I 
House, 1988, 119). The failure of Bush's initial response to the crisis led 
the Administration to opt for the historical military solution to Latin 
American problems. 
The Administration's first action was to extend economic sanctions forI one year. 20 This included the cancelling of Panama's sugar quota which 
cost the country approximately $15 million in revenue ("U.S. Expands").
I Although the original intent of the sanctions was "to squeeze 
Panama's economy" enough to spark public opposition to Noriega, trle 
I sanctions did not have the desired effect (Tonelson). While opposition to 
I 
Noriega grew, the economic sanctions worsened the living conditions of 
the very people who were a part of the opposition (U.S. Congress, House, 
1988, 119). As a result, the sanctions discredited the U.S. aim of giving 
support to the Panamanian opposition and instead gave Noriega theI	 advantage. The General managed to survive what he termed "Yankee 
sanctions" (Quigley). According to Bernal, "Noriega painted theI [economic] situation in such a way that Panamanians blame the United 
States for the lack of cash" (U.S. Congress, House, 1988, 151). Despite this 
I fact and complaints from American businesses, about the negative impact 
I 
of the sanctions' restrictions, President Bush defended his decision by 
stating that "actions and policies of the regime in Panama continue to pose 
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I 
an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreignI policy of the United States" ( Branigin 1989b, 18; "U.S. Sanctions"). 
Given the adverse effect of the sanctions vis-a-vis U.S. policy, the 
I 1989 Panamanian presidential election became the United States foremost 
I
 
opportunity to reclaim its influence in Panama. The election results would
 
determine whether the next government would be receptive to U.S.
 
interests and if the Panama canal administrator--to be a Panamanian
 
national chosen according to treaty mandate, by December 31, 1989--would
 I be a part of that same government <Robinson, 199). The U.s. refused to
 
accept a Noriega appointee for Canal Administrator; the Senate passed "a
I non-binding resolution (63-31) (deciding that it would not vote for a
 
Noriega appointee even If the (Bush] adminfstration approved one" (199).
 
I
 
I Therefore, the Bush Administration acted to defeat Noriega's Coalition of
 
National Liberation (COLINA) fn the May 7 election (Branigin 1989a, 19).
 
President Bush authorIzed the CIA's assfstance of the Democratic Allfance
 
I
 
of Civic Oppositfon Party, led by presidential candIdate Gulllermo Endara
 
("CIA") <Branigin 1989a, 19). The directive permitted the CIA to offer $10
 
million to the oppositfon party for financing its campaign costs,
 
specfffcally, secret radio and televfsion broadcasts ("Bush Seeks") ("CIA").
 I Noriega responded by ordering a halt to broadcast and publication of
 
opposition views. He also claimed that Washington's action was an attempt
I to breach the Canal Treaties ("Bush Seeks" 1989). (The U.S. would, indeed
 
violate the Treaties if President Bush refused to acknowledge a Noriega
 
I appofntee for Canal AdminIstrator) (Seib and Greenberg).
 
Noriega's response demonstrated the degree of his power over the
 
I election process. The dictator controlled tl)e Electoral Tribunal, the body
 
I
 
in charge of "(issuing] identity cards, (registering] voters, (settling]
 
electoral challenges... and officially [declaring) the winning candidates"
 
<Branigin 1989a, 19). Moreover, throu~h the Electoral Tribunal the PDF 
fssued voter identifIcation cards, cedulas. for the elections and therebyI	 rigged the registration list with multiple names and registered dead voters 
(Cochez, A 15). PDF members were also able to vote anyWhere at anytime; I an electoral code required that the Forces' members vote at the end of the 
line at the end of t1)e day (AIS). This regUlation gave the mi1ltary ample 
I opportunity to stuff ballot boxes or destroy ballots cast for the opposition 
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I 
Consequently, the May 7 election was expected to result in victory forI Noriega's candidate, Carlos Duque. Candidates of the government­
sponsored COLINA were accompanied by political organizers (military zone 
I chiefs). The presence of the military reinforced Noriega's earlier warning 
to Panamanian citizens that during the election "[they] must choose 
I between the triumph of COLINA or the disappearance of the republlc--and 
I 
[the latter Panamanians] could not permit. ..[those] who are against us 
must be liquidated, ..There Is no possibility of losing" (Cochez, A15). Thus, 
I 
when both the opposition and and COLINA claimed victory, Noriega nullified 
the election, and subsequently, Noriega supporters beat the presidential andI vice presidential candidates of the Democratic Alliance for Civic 
Opposition Party with Iron bars ("Panama Nullifies", 1),21 ApparentlyI both the U.S. and the Panamanian oppOSition had lost the final chance to 
oust Noriega. 
However, the nullification of the election prompted the U,S. to give its 
first overt response. The Bush Administration at first moved cautiously, 
calling for condemnation of the Noriega regime by other Latin American I nation-states. Adams characterizes this approach as "smart"; It indicated 
that the U,S, supported multilateral rather than unilateral action I (1989b, 10 He also observes that the Administration "cast the situation 
as a 'conflict between Noriega and the people of Panama'" rather than oneI between Noriega and the U.S. (Adams 1989b, 10 At this time experts 
suggested a semi-"hands-off" policy In order to keep Latin Americans on 
I the U.S. side and to maintain the view of Noriega as a corrupt dictator 
I 
(1989b, 10 
Latin American nation-states responded through the Organization of 
American States WAS). In May 1989, the OAS requested that Noriega make 
"conc11 iat10n formulas [leading to] a transfer of power democratically" I (Adams 1989a, I B). The OAS issued a vague statement for specific 
reasons (1989a, 1B). First, the OAS did not look favorably upon the U.S.I because of its delinquency in payment of membership dues. Second, other 
experts credit the OAS position to Washington's conditional interest in the 
I organization, Latin Americanist Mark Rosenberg states: 
I 
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I 
We've [the United States] always had great expecta­
tions of the OAS when we wanted it to do our bidding.I But after eight years of neglect, we don't have very 
many all fes there...(Adams 1989a, IB)
I 
I 
Third, the Organization faced the dilemma of upholding one of its gUiding 
principles over the other: the doctrine of non-Intervention versus the 
belief in representative democracy. Fearful that the U.S. might intervene 
in Panama the OAS decided to take a more or less neutral stance (AdamsI 1989a, IB). Adams emphasizes that the long history of U.S. intervention in 
Latin America has made the doctrine of non-intervention a high priority InI the region. In addition, all OAS members could identify with Panama's 
difficulty in establishing and maintaining a democracy (Adams 1989a, 1B). 
I 
I Therefore, in June 1989 the group of countries took its final action when it 
sent a delegation to Panama to encourage Noriega to leave We. Cordoba 
1989, A14). The OAS found that the dictator was no more willing to 
I 
cooperate with his neighbors than he was with the United States. 
Anticipating a weak response from the OAS, the Bush Administration 
began to consider three options: (1) the use of military force, (2) a total 
trade embargo, and (3) the sending of additional troops to Panama-­I increasing the current number of 10,500 (Seib and Greenberg). Of the three 
the Administration chOse the latter. On May 11, 1989, President BushI ordered 1,800 soldiers to Panama (O'Rourke, 1). The President's order was 
a "show of force" which was given to maintain support within the U.S. In 
I light of the PDF's harassment of American citizens residing in Panama, 
I 
the grounds for the action appeared solid and unquestionable. Still 
President Bush formally justified his decision with the following 
statement: 
I	 I'm worried about the lives of American citizens, 
and wi 11 do what is necessary to protect the lives 
of American citizens. And we will not be intimidatedI	 by the bullying tactics, brutal though they may be, 
of the dictator Noriega CO'Rourke, I).
I 
Tl1e Faj led Coup 
I 
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By late 1989 a Panamanian ousting of Noriega seemed Iike ly to occur.I On October 3, 1989, a group of PDF members led by Major Moises Glroldi 
attempted to overthrow the Noriega regime ("Loyalists"; "Noriega's Phone", 
I 
I 13M. The rebel officers took control of the PDF headquarters in Panama 
City and captured General Noriega ("loyalist" 1989). "After a six-hour gun 
battle," however, loyal members of the PDF wrested control from the 
I 
renegade officers and rescued Noriega (1989). 22 The rebels' intent was 
to force Noriega to retire. Under no condition did Major Giroldi and his men 
plan to kill or extradite the General ("Noriega's Phone", 13M. Still Major 
Glroldl was killed for orchestrating the couP. and according to the PUblicI Broadcasting System Program "War and Peace in Panama"--whlCh was aired 
on Apri J 12, 1991--the dissident officers who returned to PDFI headquarters were never seen again. Noriega told Panamanians that "This 
incident (corresponded] to the permanent aggression of U.S. forces against 
I the tranquil ity of [the] country" ("loyal ists"). 
I 
.In the aftermath of the event, argument in Washington centered on the 
Bush Administration's failure to act. Despite the CIA's claim that the 
rebels only sought minimal asslstance--which the U.S. provided by 
constructing street blockades--top U.S. legislators openly criticized theI	 President for his fai lure to act ("Noriega's", 13M (Sawyer). Contradicting 
the CIA, President Bush denied any U.S. involvement in the coup attempt.I	 He stated that rumors of U.S. assistance were unfounded ("Loyalists"). Yet, 
sources show that washington was notified of the plan 24 hours in 
I 
I advance. Intelligence Director Webster explained away the charges of 
inefficiency in terms of the Administration's cautious approach to the 
Noriega regime ("Noriega's PhOne", 13M. For some congressmen this 
explanation was	 inadequate. Senator Dennis DeConcini avidly advocated 
U.S. military intervention as "a warranted and absolute right under theI canal treaties" ("Bush"). Hence, the Bush Administration now confronted 
real domestic pressure for more·direct action.I
 
I
 
I
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CHAPTER 6 I ANALYSIS OF THE INVASION 
I 
I 
Every human life is precious and yet, I 
have to answer, yes, It was worth it. 23 
President George Bush, commenting on his 
I decision to invade Panama 
I Bush AdmInistration JustIfIcations 
I For two years the U.S. pressured Noriega to relinquish power and to 
leave Panama. On December 20, 1989, the lengthy effort culminated with 
I 
I the occurrence of Operation Just Cause. In the early morning hours U.S. 
forces closed in on Panama's capital city, spraying gun fire from the air 
whlle stealthy Special Operations troops moved below on the ground. 
I 
During the invasion, the Special Operations troops were to capture General 
Noriega, but the dictator evaded the ground forces. Implementing General 
Colin Powell's strategy of "overwhelming force", U.S. air power--including 
the Air Force's Stealth F-117--s1multaneously hit several targetsI throughout Panama. The chief target, however, was the Commandancia , 
the Panamanian Defense Forces Headquarters, which was completelyI destroyed. The U.S. successfully invaded the small Central American 
Country and managed to do so wlth minimal loss; 23 U,S soldiers were 
I killed and 312 were wounded ("War and Peace" 1991), Assessing all U.S. 
I 
costs, the invasion did, indeed, appear to be worthwhlle. 
On the other hand, the Bush Administration did appear at any time to be 
concerned whether or not the invasion was justified in terms of 
international law (both general and Inter-American), Prior to the militaryI strike, PresIdent Bush asserted that hIs decision to intervene was based 
on the following grounds: (I) protection of U.S. citizens; (2) "[defense of]I democracy in Panama"; (3) capture of Noriega "for violation of U.S. 
antinarcotics statues" and (4) protection of the Panama Canal (Maechling,
I 
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122; Watson, 21).24 General Noriega's declaration of Panama's state ofI war with the U.S. and the killing of an American serviceman by the PDF-­
both incidents occurring only a few days prior to the invasion--gave some 
I credibility to these proposed justifications ("U.S. Soldier"). However, 
I 
Maechling states that "the legality [of the invasion] is dubious" ("War and 
Peace" 1991). "Of the four reasons cited by Bush to justify the invasion, 
I 
two find no support in international law" (Maech1ing, 121). An examinat ion 
of the four justifications in terms of general and Inter-American 
international law indicates that Maechling's assessment is correct. 
I	 Protection of U.S. Citizens Abroad 
I A nation's right to intervene on behalf of protecting its citizens abroad 
is granted under both general international law and Inter-American law. 
I This right rests upon the condition that the country is not treating "alien 
I 
citizens" In a humanitarian manner--according to an understood 
"international standard" (Thomas and Thomas, 304-305). Intervention, 
however, Is a last resort. Both general International law and Inter­
American law require the citizens' home country to complete a two-step I process: (I) to "[exhaust] all local [legal] remedies" and (2) to "[sustain] a 
denial of justice" (Thomas and Thomas, 304, 326).' After these conditionsI are met Intervention becomes a viable option. 
Nevertheless, the two divisions of law address this course of action 
I 
I differently. General international law offers the alien's country more 
freedom in dealing with the situation because reprisals--whether armed or 
unarmed--are not categorized as a breach or the law (Thomas and Thomas, 
86,327).25 On the contrary, Inter-American law, meaning the OAS 
Charter, is more restrictive; it prohibits reprisal by an individual nation­I state on behalf of its citizens (Thomas and Thomas, 327). Instead the 
inter-American system mandates resolution or alleged aliens' rIghts I	 violatlOn by means of diplomatic negotiatIons, and if negotiations are 
unsuccessful, then the two nation-states must address the problem to theI entire OAS body (Thomas and Thomas, 138-139). This regulation was 
initiated by Article II of the Inter-American Treaty of RecIprocal 
I Assistance of 1947 (Rio Treaty), With specific regard to the US.-
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I 
Panamanian crisis, Maechling notes that the U.S., a member of the OAS, didI not attempt to resolve the alleged clt1zens' rights violations by Panama in 
this manner (124). Although the U.S. sought and received an OAS 
I condemnation of the Noriega regime, it did not use the organization to 
resolve the ongoing dispute. 
I Defending Democracy 
I Second, the Bush Administration claimed that armed intervention was 
Its means of preserving democracy. Yet, before this contention can be giveI serious consideration, the question of whether or not democracy exist 
ed in Panama prior to the Noriega regime must be answered. ReviewingI the history of the nation-state, the answer is decidedly in the negative. 
1'1aechIing states "The notion that Panama, a country governed since tts 
I inception by a corrupt oligarchy and a succession of dictatorial leaders, had 
I 
democracy to begin with is itself ludicrous" (123), 
Furthermore, the preservation of democracy as justification for 
military intervention finds no support In general international law or 
, 
inter-American law. General international law adheres to the principleI that a country's freedom "to choose any form of government or political 
institution" supersedes any other nation-state's desire for democracyI (ThOmas and Thomas, 359). Generally, "as long as a [country'sl regime does 
not breach international law, any intervention to bring about the overthrow 
I 
I of Its government, no matter hOW undemocratic it is internally, [is 1 
illegal" (Thomas and Thomas, 361). ThUS, an intervening country would 
act without legitimacy, that Is, outside of Its realm of authority by 
I 
exerCIsing power not granted to it <Brilmayer, 16). 
Likewise, the OAS, the regional body which defines the inter-American 
system, does not permit intervention by one member nation-state into 
another for the purpose of establiShing democracy (Thomas and Thomas,I 36). Inter-American law operates on the assumption that all member 
nation-states will pursue a democratic course. Even if they do not, theI doctrine of non-Intervention, established for the Inter-American system in 
1947 with the Rio Treaty, prohibits tM "threat or the use of force in any 
I 
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manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter of the UnitedI Nations or of this Treaty" (Thomas and Thomas. 436). 
I	 The Third 
I	 A trlird justification of the Bush Administration was that General Noriega who allegedly violated U.S. drug laws had to be captured and made 
to face the consequences of his actions. The U.S. based its claim toI	 Noriega on the "effects doctrine, which extends the reach of U.S. criminal 
jurisdiction beyond U.S. borders If the crime or conspiracy has an ImpactI	 inside the United States or against its citizens" (Maechling, 128). In this 
particular case, Washington asserted that Noriega's actions benefitted 
I 
I the U.S. drug trade, thereby affecting United States citizens. Application 
of the effects doctrine In International law, however, has been limited to 
terrorist activities committed in international air space, "piracy, [and] war 
I 
crimes" (Maechling, 128-129). Noriega's assistance to the Medellin drug 
cartel does not fit into any of these categories. Moreover, no prior ground 
exists within the history of the doctrine for trying heads of state (129).26 
I	 Safeguarding the Canal 
I Finally, Washington proposed that the invasion of Panama was 
necessary in order to defend the Canal and to maintain the Canal Treaties. 
I of 1979. Admittedly, the United States is entrusted with the power to 
I 
defend the Canal by Article IV of the Canal Treaties. Thus far, all 
literature on the 1989 Invasion has emphasized the fact that General 
Noriega made no direct reference to, nor did he commit any overt act of 
violence which threatened the security of the Canal or the Treaties. InI the absence of such action, the argument of the United States remains weak 
and withOut basis. Maechling best summarizes the true nature of the U.S.I	 contention with these words: 
I	 What brought the crisis to a head was that under the Commission, the administrator, was scheduled to pass 
from an American to a nominee of the PanamanianI 
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government on January I, 1990...[This fact] presented 
the Bush administration, and Congress, with theI 'embarrassing dilemma of how to deal with a govern­
ment that Washington refused to recognize.
I (Maechling 1990, 120-121) 27 
I In light of the history of U.S-Panamanian relations, Maechling's 
I 
characterization is accurate. Panamanian administration of the Canal 
would have contradicted the traditional U.S. role as the superior protecting 
the interests of Panama. 
I U.S. Public Opinion 
I 
I A survey of the U.S. citizen opinion indicates that Washington was 
politically correct in its decision to act militarily. Grier reports that 
President Bush received an 80% publ ic approval rating for the December 
I 
invasion. However, prior to the intervention only 26% of U.S. citizens 
surveyed favored the use of military force (Manegold, 30). Yet, the strong 
assent by the U.S. maSS-base after the invasion more than likely stems 
from a sense of nationalism. In a Newsweek poll of U.S. citizens prior toI the invasion, 60% of the people stated that It was "very important that 
General Noriega give up power in Panama" (Manegold, 30). Also 50%I favored a "[U.s.] halt [in] the process for giVing Panama control of the 
Panama Canal as long as Noriega [was] in power" (30). These figures
I indicate that perhaps U.S. citizens do view the Panama Canal as only 
I 
another region of the United States, and therefore, to a majority of the U.S. 
populace the Bush action was justified. 
Even the opposing DemocratIc Party was relatively silent with Its 
criticism of the adminIstration's choice of force. Some negative commentI was voiced by Senate majority leader George Mitchell and Senate Armed 
Services Committee chairman Sam Nunn (Grier, 2) Sti 11 Watson statesI that "expressions of support for Operation Just Cause were faxed to news 
organizations by many vacationing congressmen, who have learned not toI criticize invasions by popular presidents"; the polittcal costs are too 
expensive (21). Therefore, the first foreign policy decision of the Bush 
I 
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I 
Administration apparently awakened a stagnant nationalism and set the 
I tone for future U.S. policy in the international community. 
I OptiQns: Legal and Qther 
Despite the high measure of domestIc sUPPQrt for the DecemberI invasiQn, the alternatives tQ military action should be considered. During 
the cQngressional hearIngs prlQr to the InvasIQn--held In April andI June Qf 1988, expert witness testimQny revealed several Qptions, some 
Iega1and 0tl1ers not. 
I 
I Of the suggested kgQl alternatives, a joint regional action with other 
Latin American countries was the primary one. Experts advised the 
legislature to pursue a multilateral diplomatic overture because this 
course of action was more functional--feaslble and low In costs. Former 
I U.S Ambassador to Costa Rica Francis J. McNeil stated that "the least painful way to get Noriega out quickly Is fQr Latin America to mediate 
between Noriega and the opposItIon" (U.S. Congress, House, 1988, 13). InI addition to this princIpal optIon were suggestions for the U.S. to "(extract 
itself] from the crisis environment and to "(reconcile] with the (Noriega]I regime" (U.S. Congress, House 1988, 63-64). However, these options were 
classified as unsuitable for resolution of the situation. 
I Continuation of economic sanctlons--based on the assumption that 
I 
these sanctions were legal--was alsQ dismissed as an unsuitable actiQn. 
Proponents of the sanctions represented a minority in the group Qf 
Witnesses. They based their sUPPQrt fQr this opttQn Qn the grQunds that tt 
demQnstrated a strong U.S. position (U.S. Congress, House, 1988,64).I OPPQnents of sanctions, however, successfully argued that they were not 
produCing the desired result, and mQreover, that they Qnly further erQdedI suppQrt for the U.S. within Panama as well as the country's eCQnomy (U.S. 
Congress, House, 1988, 53). From the opposit iQn's viewpoint, the 
I 
I sanctions were part of a U.S. actiQn centered sQlely on oustmg Noriega and 
Qbstructed Qther goals like "the eventual restoration of demQcracy" (1988, 
53). 
I 
The single tllega! option under consideration was the use of 
cQnventlOnal military force Qr simply a military strike team (special 
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forces in covert action). The vast majority of testimony declared this 
I
 
I alternative too costly and risky. If the operation failed, the U.S. would
 
then have to contend with condemnation from the world community,
 
especially the countries of Latin America (U.S. Congress, House, 1988,27).
 
I
 
Furthermore, the absence of a direct threat to the Panama Canal by the
 
Noriega regime provided no legal grounds for U.S. military action ("U.S.
 
Congress, House, 1988, 3n St ill proponents of the measure suggested
 
that the action be reserved for later use, in the event that U.S. interests
I were directly threatened by Panama (U.S. Congress, House, 1988,64). If
 
military force were used too soon, the U.S. could lose the opportunity to
 I spread and create democracy in Central America (1988, 64).
 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
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CHAPTER 7I CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S.-PANAMANIAN RELATIONS 
I They [the United States] don't want an independent Panama. They want a sub­
subservient Panama because that is I how they've always prospered. 28 
I Former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Robert White 
I In the aftermath of the invasion the United States found that simple 
victory would not resolve the Panamanian crisis. Instead the very target of 
I 
I the Operation, General Manuel Antonio Noriega, remained free, taking refuge 
in the Vatican Embassy in Panama (Lane, 18). Noriega arrived at the 
embassy on December 24, 1989--four days after the U.S. invasion--and 
I 
stayed there until January 3, 1990, when he surrendered to U.S. troops 
("War and Peace" 199n Meanwhile within the capital city Panamanians 
looted local businesses, and !.l.S. troops faced a resistant PDF. Those 
members of the PDF who had not been killed, injured, or captured during theI invasion changed into civilian clothes and infiltrated the streets of Panama 
City in order to fight with U.S. troops. To eliminate the number of renegadeI Panamanian soldiers the U.S. military offered cash for guns and 
confiscated them from citizens' homes through raids. 
I 
Sentiment Among the Panamanian people 
I Surprisingly enough, the great majority of Panamanians viewed the 
invasion and its subsequent consequences as completely beneficial, a I liberation from the repression of the Noriega regime ("War and Peace" ). 
Larmer quotes one Panamanian as saying "There was no civilianI government before. The Defense Forces were running the country. Things 
had to change" (3). Still the Panamanian support for a U.s. invasion is,
I according to Larmer, a rarity given the history of U.S. Latin American 
relations. He states: 
I 
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I 
In any other Latin American country, Including such 
dependent U.S. allies as El Salvador or Honduras, the 
idea of U.S. Intervention Is anathema to the basic 
principle of Latin nationalism. (Larmer 3)I 
Larmer explains Panama's acceptance of the U.S. Invasion on the bases of 
I its historic relationship with the superior power--proximity and 
I 
construction of the canal. "Panama was born of the United States" and it 
has both benefitted and suffered as a result (3). 
More than ayear after the invasion, the same Panamanians who favored the 
invasion now see a new and unfavorable real ity. A primary reason for this I change In attitude is the death toll controversy. In the aftermath of the 
invasion there remained "more suffering and harm than benefits" (HortonI 11 l, Horton reports that the official claim of 556 Panamanians dead, as a 
result of the invasion, may now be more accurately stated as 2,000.I According to human rights and church groups, the official count is 
incorrect, and the unearthing of numerous bodies from mass graves in the 
I months following the invasion lend an element of truth to their claim (11). 
I 
One such mass grave was uncovered at the Garden Of Peace Cemetery in 
late December of 1989, and It revealed the remains of 275 Panamanians 
(Gannon,3). This eXhumatIon was not the only case. Other articles 
describing the invasIon aftermath cite the discovery of more mass graves,I containing 100 or more bodies ("War and Peace"). 
The occurrence of incidents like these make the statement of RobertoI Eisemann, owner of a major PanamanIan newspaper, seem prophetic: 
"people will tend to forget the NorIega regime and focus on consequences of 
I the Invasion" ("War and Peace"). Already the discovery of the mass graves 
I 
has prompted some families of the deceased to seek recompensation from 
the UnIted States government. They have filed law suits against the 
Unlted States but, as of Aprll 9, 1991, the U.S. had not made any attempt 
at restitution to the deceased Panamanians' families. Former U.S.I Ambassador to EI Salvador Robert White predicted that the U.S. inaction in 
the matter will be an "irrItant in U.S.-PanamanIan relations [in the future],I a running sore" ("War and Peace"). 
I 
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I Economic Chaos 
I In addition to the death count controversy, Panamanians are also 
I 
experi.encing severe economic difficulties. The weakened (almost non­
existent) Panamanian economy was worsened by the destruction of 
business buildings during the invasion and the looting of those same 
businesses after the invasion. In January of 1990 more than 75~ ofI Panamanian businesses were inoperable, and the total estimate 
of the material damages caused by the invasion was $2 billion (Grimes)I (Horton, 11). In response the United -States promised an aid package of 
$420 million for 1990, but as of December 1990, the U.S. had distributed 
I 
I only $120 million ( 11). Former U.S. Ambassador to Panama Ambler Ross 
clies different figures for U.S. aid, stating that the proposed aid package 
was $400 million with only $100 million in "real money" delivered to 
Panama. He suggests that the United States "clean up [its) mess" ("War and 
Peace").I Furthermore, the displacement of Panamanian citizens, from work and 
their homes, has also helped to create a stagnant economy. In post­I	 invasion Panama one-third of Panamanian adults are jobless, and 40~ live 
be low the poverty 1ine (Horton 1991, 11). A pertinent exampIe are theI residents of the barrio, ChOrillo--one of the areas hardest hit during the 
invasion--who represent the lower middle-class and the poor of 
I Panamanian society, According to the program "War and Peace in Panama" 
I 
(April, 1991), the lower middle-class and the poor make up two-thirds of 
the country's population, and these same Individuals face an unemployment 
rate which is 25% greater than the one under Noriega. Despite the new 
Panamanian government's claim that it has built new apartments andI opened savings accounts for all the displaced families, the people of 
Chorilio remain homeless ("War and Peace" 1991). The peopleI have found that the reparations of $7, 300 per fami Iy are insufficient 
(Horton 1991, 1l).
I
 
I
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The Likelihood of pemocracyI 
In the aftermath of the invasion, Panamanians also question the 
I efficacy of their new democratic government. Since the country lacks a 
I 
history of functional procedural democracy, the U.S.-installed Endara 
government is under close scrutiny. President Guillermo Endara--who was 
I 
sworn in "on a U.S. base right before the invasion," must face a society 
shaped within the last 20 years by anationalistic military government 
(Maechl in, 122). His greatest challenge is uniting the rabj blancos 
(white butts)--"middle-class businessmen and professionals--and the r:alllI prietos (dark butts)--the poor of Panamanian SOCiety, the latter Which 
represents the strong support group of both Torrijos and NoriegaI (Morganthau, 25). The current condition of Panamanian affairs, 
however, indicate that President Endara is not making progress. For 
I example, drug trafficking and money laundering are occurring at a rate 
I 
higher than that under Noriega ("War and Peace"). The country's weak 
judicial system does not punish those individuals charged With drug 
trafficking, and corruption within government agencies persists. 
Consequ.ently, Endara and his administration have gained the reputation ofI being weak. Most Panamanians--at least those like newspaperman 
Roberto Eisemann who are familiar with the concept of a functional I democracy--consider them "amateurs" in the game of democracy ("War and 
Peace") 
I 
I Therefore, more than one year after the invasion, U.S. troops still 
occupy and maintain stabilIty in the country. A total of 7,000 U.S. troops 
were added to the 12,700 already based in Panama In response to looting 
post-invasion Panama City. After one day, 2,500 more troops were sent to 
the country (Watson, 16). A new civi 1ian Panamanian pol ice force knownI as the Public Force assists the U.S. troops in their duties ("War and Peace"). 
Ironically, the 11 ,OOO-member police force is composed of 98r. former PDFI	 members. Hence, the Panamanian people wonder if they will have 
eventually eXChanged one military regime for yet another. For instance, inI December 1990, Herrera Hassan, a former PDF member, staged a coup 
attempt. Panamanians watched While the new Public Force took no action 
I to stop the unrest. Finally, U.S. troops arrived to end the attempted 
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overthrow. This incident is more than likely indicative of the future for 
I Panama. Apparently, the country's path to democracy will be a shaky and 
arduous one. If the United States seeks to maintain its historical 
I relationship with Panama, then it will have to be continuously present in 
I 
Panama as the country makes its transition. Otherwise "mfl itarization 
will once again [take root In Panama]" <U.S. Congress, House, 1988, 1St). 29 
I 
I 
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 CONClUSION
 
Three questions are pertinent when addressing the future of I U.S-Panamanian relations: (1) Will the de facto protectorate status 
continue and, if so, what will be the long-term consequences?; (2) WhatI options realistically exist for changing the present state of U.S.­
Panamanian relations?; and (3) Will Panama and other Central American and 
I Caribbean states be the object of a different set of long-term U.S. policies, 
I 
ones that are more functional than the simplistic and overly expensive use 
of milaary force? The answer to these questions lies in the very heart of 
United States-Latin American policy toward in the 1990s. The new 
decade ushers in a different world order and indeed, it is one completelyI different from that of the Cold War period. 
Wah the development of the new political arena, the United States hasI abandoned the belief of an international political system divided into the 
two spheres of East and West--consider the current state of the SOViet 
I 
I Union--however, Washington still assumes a division of "Good" and "Evil". 
In regard to Latin America the U.S. perceives this division in terms of Latin 
"sloppiness" (bad) versus Gringo "efficiency" (bad). The very occurrence of 
I 
Operation Just Cause confirms this general conclusion. Therefore, in the 
case of Panama, the de facto protectorate will continue. The imposition of 
the U.S.-backed Endara government upon the Panamanian people indicates a 
continuation of U.S. tutelage and U.S. support for the traditional oligarchy. I GUillermo Endara and the majority of his coalition represent the el1te of 
Panama. Likewise the continued US military presence in post-invasion I Panama indicates that Washington still seeks a Panamanian military which 
is receptive to U.S. interests but strong enough to replace any sloppy
I civilian government. 
After 20 years of militarization, the continuation of the de facto 
I protectorate will prove to be disastrous for Panama. The special 
I 
relationship with WaShington produced the rule of both Torrijos and 
Noriega, and in the future it will produce similar regimes. In fact, 
President GUi llermo Endara, a member of the Arnulfista Party, recently 
expelled cabinet members belonging to the Christian Democratic Party I (PDCl for allegedly carrying out a spy operation in conjunctlOn with 
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members of the police force (Brooks,4). The POC monitored the activity 
of "political opponents" (the POC and the Arnulfista Party are the "two 
major political parties" in Panama). In response to Endara's action, 
Ricardo Arias Calderon, the current vice president of Panama and leader of I the POC, has vowed to "form an opposition to the government: The 
formation of an opposition will dissolve the coalition which in 1987 I protested the Noriega regime. As a result, President Endara now faces the 
possibility of the POC joining with the new civilian police in order I overthrow of his government (4). ThUS, the future for Panama could entail 
a perpetual cycle of economic, social and more importantly, political 
I instability--of the kind it is experiencing In the aftermath of the invasion. 
I 
The only real istic avenue for changing the future of Panama and the 
nature of U.S.-Panamanian relations is for Washington to make a change in 
its policy toward the isthmian nation-state. Such a change will occur If 
the U.S. views North-South relations in terms of the new world order. I	 Kurth suggests that the United States replace its traditional assumptions 
about its place in the international community with ones more suitable forI this new order. Specifically, the Unites States must abandon its 
assumptions of a strategic bipolarity (in balance of power terms) and 
I economic, ideological, and political superiority (Newfarmer, 3) Instead 
I 
the U.S. must first, identify itself as the head of a multinational coalition 
of nations (strategic multipolarity) (Newfarmer, 9). Second, Washington 
I 
must assume a position of "first among equals" in the international 
economic community (economic multipolarity) Third, it must begin to 
incorporate religion and other societal factors in its understanding of 
other nation-states' ideologies (ideological multipolarity). Finally, theI U.S. must organize Its foreign policy based on the assumption of polftical 
allies rather than politlcal enemies (9).I With these modifications in place, Panama and other Central American 
Caribbean states might become the object of a different set of long-term 
I	 U.S. policies. Panama. In particular, would then have the opportunity to 
I 
transform itself into a functional independent democracy Assummg a new 
world outlook, the U.S. would no longer seek to control the Panamanian 
I 
government but rather to assist it. For example, if in post-invasion 
Panama a government took power--other than the U.S.-Installed Endara 
I
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I	 government--Washington would approach it in the spirit of cooperation, based on the perception of the government as a potential ally. This 
difference in approach would serve to further U.S. national interests in the I region. Changes in the U.S. perspective on Latin America, such as this, 
might in time dissolve the U.S. protectorate in Panama, putting an end toI	 centuries of violation of International law and reestablishing a sovereign 
Central American neighbor. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I NOTES 
I 1 While this release of the right of non-intervention is not violative of international law--accordlng to the prevailing school of legal thought-­
the protectorate, by the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. (meaning, at this I point of affairs, in these circumstances) can extract Itself from the 
protectorate agreement (See Thomas 92-93).I 2 The Quotations indicate that the rebels may not have sought a 
complete change of Panamanian political, economic, social, and 
I psychological structures (total sociaI revo lut ion) but merely independence 
I 
from Colombia.. 
3 Bunau-Varilla was instrumental in forming the New Panama Canal 
I 
Company after the first French construction effort failed. Ferdinand de 
Lesseps' plan to build a sea-level canal instead of one using locks--led toI his failure (See McCullough, "Book One", for a more detailed accountl. 
4 The Roosevelt Administration desired a canal in Panama, butI Senator John Tyler Morgan favored a Nicaraguan site (McCullough 263). 
5 See McCullough's Path Between the Seas. Chapters 12 and 13, for a 
I chronology of the events surrounding the drafting of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla 
Treaty of 1903. 
6 (LaFeber 1989, 24) 
I 
7 Tannenbaum's Ten Keys to Latin America Is a valuable resource for 
gaining an understanding of Latin America's history in terms of politics, 
society, and reI igion. 
8 This statement is not to discount the later political activeness of I the Church but gives a general description of its traditional role. 
9 The meaning and effect of Us. military presence in Panama will beI covered In the discussion of the national security state. 
10 LaFeber states that mestizos represented over 200,000 of the early
I Panamanian population. In present-day Panama mestizos and mulattos 
I 
represent 70% of a population of 1,830,175. 
1I See McCullough for a detai led history of U.S. Canal Zone 
Administration evolution. 
12 Blacks from the U.S. and the West Indies were given Jobs in theI Zone before Panamanian workers. This practice resulted in Panamanian 
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I resentment of the alien workers and Canal Zone administration. 
I 
13 The summary of events in Panama's early economic relationship 
with the United States was taken from LaFeber, pages 60-65. 
14 The National Civic Crusade for Democracy was formed in 1987 to 
voice opposition to the Noriega government. Its membership is largely I composed of white upper- and middle-class Panamanians. 
15 This description of the national security state as perceived by theI Reagan Administration Is not meant to Imply that only that Administration 
had strong anti-communist concerns. 
I 16 The National Guard was created from the Panamanian National 
I 
Police by Commander JOS~ Antonio Rem~n in the early 1950s (Nyrop, 33). 
17 (U.S. Congress, House, 1988, 8) 
I 
18 Robinson notes that the Democratic Revolutionary Party, which was 
create by Torrijos, "is an alliance of business interests and the military"I (1989, 188). 
19 This statement Is not meant to convey the idea that Noriega and theI PDF were not repressive but rather that the true nature of the U.S.-Noriega 
struggle was not openly discussed. 
I 20 The expiration date for the sanctions imposed by the Bush 
Administration was April 8, 1990. 
21 Noriega supporters, who were primarily from the lower class, 
I 
perhaps feared losing their patron. To these people Endara and his 
followers more than likely represented the traditional elite who would end 
their new-found prosperity. 
22 According to CIA Director William Webster, Noriega was able toI telephOne "his mistress and other supporters [to tell them] to rescue him" 
("Noriega'S Phone", 13M.I 23 ("War and Peace", Apri 19, 1991) 
24 The rumor of "a 250-man urban commando unit specifically trained 
I for terrorist assault on American neighborhoods" more than likely prompted 
I 
the first justification (Watson, 21), 
25 See page 86 of Thomas and Thomas for further explanation of the 
I 
term reprisal in relation to international law, 
26 Even more questionable is President Bush's offer of a $1 million 
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bounty for Noriega when special operations troops failed to capture himI during the invasion. 
27 See Maechling for an excellent discussion of the illegality of 
I Washington's refusal to recognize the Solis Palma government. 
28 ("War and Peace ", Apri I 9, 1991) 
29 This statement is based on the assumption that the U.S. wantsI Panama to be a functional procedural democracy. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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